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The economic theory that serves as the basis for coordinating economic activities in the global
market system and for implementing economic solutions for environmental problems is neoclassical
economics. In economic textbooks, the creators of this theory are credited with transforming the
study of economics into a rigorously mathematical scientiﬁc discipline. But what is not widely known
is that neoclassical economic theory was created by substituting economic constructs derived from
classical economics for physical variables in the equations of a soon-to-be outmoded mid nineteenth
century theory in physics. The mathematical formalism that resulted from these substitutions was
predicated on unscientiﬁc axiomatic assumptions that remained essential unchanged in subsequent
extensions and reﬁnements of neoclassical economic theory. And this explains why the
mathematical formalism used by contemporary practitioners of neoclassical economic theory
effectively precludes the prospect of implementing scientiﬁcally viable economic solutions for a broad
range of very menacing environmental problems.
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ROBERT L. NADEAU: BROTHER, CAN YOU SPARE ME A PLANET?
1. INTRODUCTION
The causes of the environmental crisis may be staggeringly
complex, but the most effective way to deal with it in economic
terms seems rather obvious. We must use our best scientiﬁc
understanding of how to coordinate economic activities in
environmentally responsible ways as a basis for implementing
scientiﬁcally viable economic solutions for global warming and
other menacing environmental problems. Virtually all political
leaders and economic planners assume that these solutions can
be implemented within the framework of the economic theory
that now serves as the basis for coordinating economic activities
in the global market system—neoclassical economics. And all
the proposals that will be considered during the last phase of
forging the terms of a post Kyoto agreement on global warming
are predicated on this assumption. 
In economics textbooks, the creators of neoclassical economic
theory are credited with disclosing the lawful dynamics of market
systems and transforming the study of economics into a
rigorously mathematical scientiﬁc discipline. But there are no
mentions in these textbooks, or in all but a few books on the
history of economic thought, of a rather salient fact—neoclassical
economic theory was created by substituting economic
constructs derived from classical economics for physical
variables in the equations of a soon-to-be outmoded theory in
physics (Mirowski, 1988; Nadeau 2003; Nadeau 2006). 
A number of well known physicists and mathematicians told the
economists who created this theory that the economic constructs
were utterly different from the physical variables and there was
no logical or scientiﬁc basis for making the substitutions. But the
economists apparently failed to comprehend how devastating this
criticism was and proceeded to claim that they had transformed
the study of economics into a scientiﬁc discipline. As it turned out,
the origins of neoclassical economic theory in mid-nineteenth
century physics were forgotten and the claim that the theory is
scientiﬁc was almost universally accepted. 
At this point, allow me to stress that it is not my intention to
launch an ill mannered attack on the intellectual or moral
integrity of members of the economic profession. There is
nothing wrong with using sophisticated mathematical formalism
to model tendencies to occur in complex systems, and the
formalism used by the practitioners of neoclassical economic
theory provides a reasonably coherent basis for coordinating
economic activities in market systems. And if one assumes that
the only reasonable criteria for assessing the scientiﬁc validity of
an economic theory are pragmatic and utilitarian, a good case can
be made that neoclassical economic theory has passed this test
with ﬂying colors. 
But as this discussion will demonstrate, this theory can no longer
be viewed as useful in even strictly pragmatic or utilitarian terms
because it fails to meet what must now be viewed as the
fundamental criterion for the usefulness of any economic theory
—the extent to which the theory allows economic activities to be
coordinated in environmentally responsible ways on a planetary
scale. Unfortunately, understanding why neoclassical economic
theory cannot pass this test requires some familiarity with a
subject that most people are not very interested in and would
probably prefer to know nothing more about—the history of
mainstream economic theory.
2. THE NOT SO WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
The creators of classical economic theory were eighteenth
century moral philosophers who were attempting to understand
new economic conditions that were altering the balance of power
between sovereign nation-states. Markets as a means of
exchanging goods had existed from the beginnings of recorded
history, but the idea of a market system as a means of
maintaining an entire society did not emerge until the
seventeenth century. This was a time when the old economic
order, premised on custom and command, gave way to a new
economic order that was sensitively dependent on the actions of
proﬁt-seeking individuals operating within the contexts of
national market systems (Heilbroner, 1992).
Since the complex web of institutions, laws, policies, and
processes that sustain and regulate production and exchange in
modern markets did not exist, the new economic order more
closely resembled a buzzing confusion than a rational process.
The eighteenth century moral philosophers who created classical
economic theory (Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David
Ricardo) believed that order lay beneath this chaos and that the
ideal model for disclosing this order was Newtonian physics. And
all of these ﬁgures participated in and were greatly inﬂuenced by
a widespread philosophical and religious movement in the
eighteenth century known as Deism. 
The fundamental impulse in this movement was to make belief in
the existence of God consistent with the implications of the
mechanistic world view of Newtonian physics. Since this physics
assumes that physical laws completely determine the future
state of physical systems, the Deists concluded that the universe
does not require, or even permit, active intervention by God after
the ﬁrst moment of creation. They then imaged God as a
clockmaker and the universe as a clock regulated and maintained
after its creation by physical laws.
Smith, Malthus and Ricardo believed that this Deistic God created
two sets of laws to govern the workings of the clockwork
universe—the laws of Newtonian physics and the natural laws of
economics (Nadeau 2003: pp19-36; Nadeau 2006: pp102-123).
And they also believed that the natural laws of economics
legislate over decisions made by economic actors in much the
same way that Newton’s laws of gravity legislate over the
movements and interactions of material objects. Adam Smith
imaged the collective action of the natural laws of economics as
an “invisible hand,” and this hand in his view was that of the
providential but absentee Deistic god (Ingrao et al. 1990).
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In Wealth of Nations, Smith said that the invisible hand is
analogous to the invisible force that causes a pendulum to
oscillate around its center and move toward equilibrium or a
liquid to ﬂow between connecting chambers and ﬁnd its own
level. Based on this analogy, Smith claimed that this unseen hand
is the force that moves independent actors in pursuit of different
values toward the equalization of rates of return and accounts for
the tendency of markets to move from low to high returns. Given
that Smith’s invisible hand has no physical content and is an
emblem for something postulated but completely unproven and
unknown, why did he assume that it actually exists? The answer
is that Smith was a Deist and his belief in the existence of the
invisible hand was an article of faith.
The physics that the creators of neoclassical economics, all of
whom were trained as engineers, used as a template for their
mathematical theories was developed from the 1840s to the
1860s. During this period, physicists responded to the inability of
Newtonian mechanics to account for the phenomena of heat,
light, and electricity with a profusion of hypotheses about matter
and forces. In 1847 Hermann-Ludwig Ferdinand von Helmholtz,
one of the best known and most widely respected physicists at
this time, posited the existence of a vague and ill-deﬁned energy
that could unify these phenomena. This served as a catalyst for a
movement called “energetics” in which physicists attempted to
explain very diverse physical phenomena in terms of a uniﬁed and
protean ﬁeld of energy. 
Because the physicists were unable to specify the actual
character of this energy and could not be precise about what was
being measured, their theories were not subject to repeatable
experiments under controlled conditions. The amorphous
character of energy in the physical theories also obliged the
physicists to appeal to the law of the conservation of energy which
states that the sum of kinetic and potential energy in a closed
system is conserved. This appeal was necessary because it was
the only means of asserting that the vaguely deﬁned system
described in the theory somehow remains the “same” as it
undergoes changes and transformations (Mirowski, 1988: 
pp. 19-20).
The strategy used by the creators of neoclassical economics was
as simple as it was absurd—they wrote down the equations of the
mid-nineteenth century physical theory and substituted
economic variables for the physical variables. Utility was
substituted for energy, the sum of utility for potential energy, and
expenditure for kinetic energy. The forces associated with utility-
energy were represented as prices and spatial coordinates
described quantities of goods. In the mathematical formalism
that resulted from these substitutions, the economic actor is
presumed to operate within a ﬁeld of force identiﬁed, in both
ﬁgurative and literal terms, with energy.
In an effort to justify the claim that the resulting formalism could
disclose the hidden dynamics of a market system, the economists
argued that this system, like the physical systems described in
the equations, is closed. The economists also claimed that the
sum of utility in a market system, like the sum of energy in the
physical theory, is conserved. None of these now famous
economists seemed to realize that the sum of income and utility
in an economic system is not conserved and that the conservation
principle is quite meaningless in any real economic process.
Nevertheless, this assumption serves to legitimate the existence
of the invisible hand in its current form—constrained
maximization in general equilibrium theory. 
After concluding that utility, like energy in the equations taken
from the physics, is conserved, the economists were obliged to
conclude that production and consumption of goods and
commodities are physically neutral processes that do not alter
the sum of utility. In an attempt to explain why this is the case, the
economists arrived a very strange interpretation of what was then
regarded as a self-evident truth in the physical sciences—the law
of the conservation of matter or the idea that matter cannot be
created or destroyed. If matter, said the economists, is
immutable, then the production of goods and commodities
cannot alter or change the basic stuff out of which they are made.
They then argued that any value that accrues as a result of
production and distribution of goods and commodities can only
reside in the mental space of economic actors. 
This was the origins of two assumptions that are foundational to
neoclassical economic theory and embedded in the
mathematical formalism used by mainstream economists:
(i) Economic actors interact within a ﬁeld of force (utility) in
which the natural laws of economics legislate over their
economic decisions and determine the value of goods,
commodities, and services; and 
(ii) The value of these goods, commodities, and services
circulates in this ﬁeld as capital in a closed loop from
production to consumption in a domain of reality which is
separate and distinct from other domains. 
This misalliance between economic thought and mid-nineteenth
century physics explains why the economic theory used by virtually all
mainstream economists is predicated on the following assumptions:
• The market is a closed circular ﬂow between production
and consumption with no inlets or outlets.
• Market systems exist in a domain of reality separate and
distinct from the external environment.
• The natural laws of economics act causally on economic
actors within closed market systems and these actors obey
ﬁxed decision making rules.
• The natural laws of economics, if left alone, will ensure that
closed market systems will perpetually grow and expand.
• The unimpeded operations of the natural laws 
of economics will result in the perpetual expansion of 
these systems. 
• Environmental problems result from market failures or
incomplete markets.
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3. A GREEN THUMB ON THE INVISIBLE HAND
The practitioners of neoclassical economic who specialize in
developing economic solutions for environmental problems are
called environmental economics. This orthodox approach to
dealing with environmental problems is taught in universities and
practiced in government agencies and development banks, and
the solutions are embedded in the mathematical formalism of
general equilibrium theory. In this formalism, the point of
convergence that allegedly legitimates the real or actual
existence of the natural laws of economics is U, the symbol for the
utility function, and the concrete effects of the operation of these
laws allegedly manifest in decisions made by economic actors.
Because functional market economies must, in accordance with
neoclassical economic theory, grow or expand, environmental
economists presume that the health of these economies is
sensitively dependent on the consumption of increasingly larger
amounts of environmental resources. And because the theory is
predicated on the assumption that a market system exists in a
domain of reality separate and distinct from the natural
environment, environmental economists assume that
environmental resources outside of this domain are not subject to
the pricing mechanisms that operate within the system. Like
other mainstream economists, the environmental economists
also assume that the natural laws of economics legislate over
decisions made by economic actors, that pricing mechanisms
are the indices of these decisions, and that the “real” value 
of environmental resources can only be determined by 
these mechanisms.
When environmental economists calculate the environmental
costs of economic activities, these calculations are based on the
assumption that the relative price of each bundle of an
environmental good, service, or amenity reveals the “real
marginal values” of the consumer. The creators of neoclassical
economics conceived of the construct of marginal values after
substituting utility for energy in the equations borrowed from
mid-nineteenth century physics. In the resulting formalism, a
marginal value essentially represents how much a consumer is
willing to pay a little bit more of something to acquire a little bit
more of something else. Note what the writers of our standard
textbook on environmental economics have to say about the
dynamics of this process:
“The power of a perfectly functioning market rests in its
decentralized process of decision making and exchange; no
omnipotent planner is needed to allocate resources. Rather,
prices ration resources to those that value them the most and, in
doing so, individuals are swept along by Adam Smith’s invisible
hand to achieve what is best for society as a collective. Optimal
private decisions based on mutually advantageous exchange lead
to optimal social outcomes.” (Hanley N. et al. 1997).
In environmental economics, the presumption that optimal
private decisions “based on mutually advantageous exchange”
ROBERT L. NADEAU: BROTHER, CAN YOU SPARE ME A PLANET?
• The natural laws of economics can resolve environmental
problems via price mechanisms and more efﬁcient
technologies and production processes.
• Inputs of raw materials into the closed market system from
the external environment are “free” unless or until costs
associated with their use are internalized within the system.
• The external resources of nature are largely inexhaustible,
and those that are not can be replaced by other resources
or by technologies that minimize the use of the exhaustible
resources or rely on other resources.
• The external environment is a bottomless sink for waste
materials and pollutants.
• The costs of damage to the external environment by
economic activities must be treated as costs that lie outside
the closed market system, or as costs that are not included
in the pricing mechanisms that operate within 
these systems.
• These costs can be internalized in the closed market
system with the use of shadow pricing and the
establishment of property rights for environmental
resources and amenities.
• There are no biophysical limits to the growth of 
market systems. 
Obviously, all of these assumptions are fundamentally wrong in
scientiﬁc terms. In these terms, markets are open systems that exist
in embedded and interactive relationship to the global environment,
and there is a very deﬁnite relationship between economic activities
and the state of the natural environment. Natural resources are
clearly exhaustible and our over-reliance on some of these resources,
particularly fossil fuels, could soon result in irreversible large-scale
changes in the global climate system. The natural environment is not
separate from economic processes, and wastes and pollutants from
these processes are already at levels that threaten the stability and
sustainability of virtually all environmental subsystems. Last but not
least, the limits to the growth of the global economy in biophysical
terms are real and inescapable, and the assumption that market
systems can perpetually expand and consume more scarce and
nonrenewable natural resources is utterly false (Nadeau, 2006: 
pp. 81-145). 
A number of theoretical economists have argued that assumptions
about the lawful dynamics of market systems in neoclassical
economic theory are fundamentally ﬂawed (Leontief, 1981; Shubik
1982; Aubin, 1998). But the vast majority of mainstream economists in
both business and government are not terribly concerned with the
most advanced theoretical work in their discipline. Legions of these
economists are engaged on a daily basis in developing analyses and
making predictions that guide the decision-making of political leaders
and economic planners. Most of these individuals are aware that the
resulting economic activities could have destructive environmental
impacts and seek to minimize these impacts. But these good
intentions are largely ineffectual because the mathematical theories
used by the economists preclude the prospect of realistically
assessing the environmental impacts of economic activities in
monetary terms.
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lead to optimal social outcomes for the state of the environment
is a primary article of faith. But according to these economists,
this will not occur unless the following conditions apply—the
market system in which economic actors make optimal private
decisions must operate more or less perfectly, and the prices, or
values, of environmental goods and services must be represented
as a function of those decisions. But if these conditions are met,
environmental economists assume that the lawful or law-like
mechanisms of the market system will resolve environmental
problems when the “prices are right.”
The “right price” in neoclassical economic theory is a function of
the prices that economic actors have paid, or are willing to pay, to
realize some marginal beneﬁts of environmental goods and
services. This explains why much of the work of environmental
economists is devoted to estimating the environmental costs of
economic activities in these terms. This view of right prices also
explains why the term “environmental externalities” has a rather
peculiar meaning in the literature of mainstream economists.
Externalities are situations in which the production or
consumption of one economic actor affects another who did not
pay for the good produced or consumed, and externalities are
viewed as either negative or positive. For example, environmental
economists often cite pollution as an example of the former and
preservation of biological diversity as an example of the latter.
When these economists use the phrase “environmental
externalities,” they are referring to environmental goods and
services that are “external” to market systems in the sense that
they are presumed to exist outside of the domain in which the
allegedly lawful or law-like dynamics of these systems operate.
4. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
MAINSTREAM ECONOMIC THEORY
Environmental economists often use cost beneﬁt analyzes to place
a value on environmental externalities, and the process of creating
public policies to deal with environmental problems has been
massively inﬂuenced by the results of these analyses. The problem
that these accounting procedures are intended to resolve is that the
only “real marginal values” the economists can confer on the
environment are determined by the operation of the natural laws of
economics within closed market systems. Given that the vast
majority of the damage done to the natural environment by
economic activities cannot be valued in these terms, environmental
economists have developed indirect methods designed to estimate
the “use-value” of these resources (Hanemann; 1994).
The process of developing these methods became a growth
industry after Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12291 in
1981. The Order required that cost-beneﬁt analyses be performed
for all environmental regulations in the United States with annual
costs in excess of $100 million and stipulated that regulations could
be implemented only if the beneﬁts to society exceed the costs. In
theory, this concept seems fairly straightforward and very
appealing. Why should we spend money dealing with an
environmental problem if the costs exceed the beneﬁts?
But when translated into the methods for evaluation used by
environmental economists, “beneﬁts to society” means the
optimal social outcomes that result from the operation of the
natural laws of economics within closed market systems. And the
“costs” against which those beneﬁts are measured refers to other
manifestations of these non-existent laws—the amounts that
economic actors are willing to pay to protect or preserve
environmental goods, services and amenities, or the amounts
they are willing to accept for the exploitation or consumption of
those goods, services or amenities.
For example, the travel cost method is predicated on the
assumption that the value a non-market resource, such as
national parks and public forests, can be estimated based on the
amount of money an economic actor would be willing to sacriﬁce
to appreciate natural beauty. In this method, a statistical
relationship between observed visits to non-market resources of
natural beauty and the costs of visiting those resources is derived
and used as a surrogate demand curve from which the
consumer’s surplus per visit-day can be measured. While the
travel cost method of evaluation may seem rather esoteric and
quite strange, it has been widely used in cost-beneﬁt analyses of
proposals in the U.S. and Britain to create or preserve publicly
owned recreational areas (Fletcher et al. 1990).
Contingent valuation methods have been used to assess the
economic value of recreation, scenic beauty, air quality, water
quality, species preservation, bequests to future generations and
other non-market environmental resources. The methods are
intended to assess the willingness-to-pay function of economic
actors who would prefer to preserve natural environments
(preservation or existence values), maintain the option of using
natural resources (option values), andbequeath natural
resources to future generations (bequestvalues) (Sagoff, 1988).
Most contingent valuation surveys seek to determine the
maximal amount that individuals are willing to pay for an increase
in the quality of an environmental resource and the minimal
amount they are willing toaccept as compensation to forgot 
this increase. 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that contingent
valuations are capable of fully revealing maximal social outcomes
of environmental policy decisions. Are we then to believe, as one
such study showed (Mitchell and Carson 1986), that reduction in
chemical contaminants in drinking water was not important in
economic terms because the value of a statistical life associated
with a reduction in risk of death in thirty years was only $181,000?
Is $26 a measure of the real marginal costs of pollution because
this is the average price that a household is willing to pay annually
for a 10 percent improvement of visibility in eastern U.S. cities?
(Tolley G. et al., 1986). Is the value of Whooping Cranes the 
$22 per year average that one set of households was willing to
pay to preserve this species (Bowker and Stoll 1985) and that of
the Bald Eagle the $11 per year average that another set of
households would spend to preserve this apparently less valuable
species? (Boyle and Bishop 1987).
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The assumption that market systems are separate and distinct
from environmental systems is also apparent in the methods
used by environmental ecologists to assess long-term economic
impacts of changes in the global environment. For example, a
well-known environmental economist notes in a study on the
potential impact of global warming on the global economy that
“climate change is likely to have different impacts on different
sectors in different countries.” He then says the following about
the U.S. economy:
In reality, most of the U.S. economy has little interaction with
climate. For example, cardiovascular surgery and parallel
computing are undertaken in carefully controlled environments
and are unlikely to be directly affected by climate change. More
generally, underground mining, most services, communications,
and manufacturing are sectors likely to be largely unaffected by
climate change—sectors that comprise about 85 percent of GNP
(Nordhaus, 1993). 
The claim that sectors of an economy can be isolated from the
impacts of global warming because they have little or no
“interaction” with climate makes no sense at all. In the climate
models environmental scientists use to study global warming, it
is quite clear that increases in the 3 to 6 degree Centigrade range
would have disastrous impacts on all natural environments,
including those within the borders of the United States. Imagine
that 80 percent of the corn crop in this country failed, that the
waters ﬂowing down Colorado River dropped in volume by 
70 percent, that ﬁsheries in most coastal waters collapsed, and
one begins to get a sense of the scope of these potential impacts.
Other market-based instruments that environmental economists
use to posit economic solutions to environmental problems, such
as subsidies, incentive structures, performance bonds and
deposit refund schemes, are also premised on the assumption
that the natural laws of economics actually exist and legislate
over decisions made by economic actors.  
5. MAINSTREAM ECONOMICS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
Most of the commentary on the failure of the international
community to effectively deal with the crisis in the global
environment puts the blame on the usual suspects—the greed of
international corporations, the inability of rich countries to
empathize with the plight of poor countries, and the refusal of
ﬁrst world nations to accept any changes in the global balance of
power. But the principal barrier to the resolution of this crisis is
not the usual suspects. It is the failure to realize that unscientiﬁc
assumptions in neoclassical economic theory effectively disallow
the prospect of forging agreements that implement scientiﬁcally
viable solutions. 
The ﬁrst step in this process is to negotiate a “general framework
convention” that deﬁnes the environmental problem and the
broad policy issues involved. If the negotiations do not break down
at this stage, the framework convention could be implemented
over time in a “regime.” A regime is an evolving system that
deﬁnes the problem in more speciﬁc terms, the action oriented
“protocols” that could solve the problem, and the procedures and
rules that should be followed. The agreements that survive this
process have been hugely ineffectual. One reason why this is the
case is the legal principle of state sovereignty allows
governments to protect their economic interests at every stage of
the negotiations. The other is that the interests governments
seek to protect are based on the results of economic analyses
done by the practitioners of neoclassical economic theory and
there is no basis in this theory for implementing scientiﬁcally
viable economic solutions. 
The unfortunate result is that the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (1992) failed to protect the climate system, the
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) did not even begun to
reduce losses in biodiversity, and the Convention to Combat
Desertiﬁcation (1994) did not slow, much less reverse, this
process. The Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and a host
of other international agreements which were intended to reduce
ocean pollution, to prevent over-ﬁshing, and to protect
endangered species failed to meet any of these objectives.
Nonbinding principles that would promote more sustainable
management of forests were agreed to at the Earth Summit
(1992) but negotiations broke down prior to the point where a
general framework convention could be articulated. A Convention
on the Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses has
been negotiated, but it has not gone into effect because some
sovereign nation-states perceive this agreement as a threat to
their economic interests (Speth, 2004). 
Scientiﬁc evidence may play a supportive and enabling role in
some negotiations, but only as a minimum condition for serious
consideration of an environmental issue. For example, numerous
scientiﬁc studies on the damage done to European forests by
sulfur dioxide emissions led to an agreement in 1985 that reduced
these emissions to 30 percent of 1980 levels. Similarly, the
scientiﬁc evidence presented in the Second Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was partially
responsible for the passage in 1997 of the Kyoto Protocol to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change. But what is not
widely known is that these agreements made a mockery of the
scientiﬁcally based solutions. In the vast majority of negotiations
on a great range of issues, such as commercial whaling,
hazardous waste trade, loss of biodiversity, conditions in the
Antarctic, and ocean dumping of radioactive waste, the scientiﬁc
evidence was not given serious consideration. When this evidence
was perceived as a direct threat to the perceived vested interests
of particular nation-states, it was either systematically ignored or
explicitly rejected by the representatives of these states (Porter 
et al., 2000: pp1-34).
6. THE TWO CULTURE PROBLEM 
In my view, the greatest obstacle to implementing scientiﬁcally
viable economic solutions for environmental problems is not the
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claim that neoclassical economic theory is scientiﬁc. It is the two
culture problem famously described by British physicist and
novelist C. P. Snow in a lecture given at Oxford University in 1959
(Snow, 1993). Snow was concerned that the single intellectual
culture that existed prior to World War II was splitting into two
cultures with social scientists on one side of the two-culture
divide and scientists on the other. As it turned out, the two-culture
problem was not resolved, the members of the two cultures
became increasingly isolated from each other, and the two-
culture divide eventually became a yawning chasm.
The failure to resolve the two-culture problem explains why the
members of the cultures of mainstream economists and
environmental scientists have virtually no contact with one
another and perform completely different roles and functions
during every stage in the process of developing solutions for
environmental problems. It also explains why the language used
by members of one culture is virtually incomprehensible to the
members of the other and why the cultural differences are very
large. These differences range from alternate worldviews and
methodologies to disparate rules for gathering evidence and
making predictions based on this evidence. 
The most expedient way to resolve this two-culture problem is
also the most efﬁcient way to develop scientiﬁcally viable
economic solutions for environmental problems. The solution is
to create institutional frameworks and processes that require
mainstream economists and environmental scientists to work
closely together during every stage in the process of developing
these solutions. But this vital enterprise will not be successful
unless the scientists and the economists who participate in this
process are willing to violate the unwritten rule that members of
one culture must not challenge the knowledge claims of those on
other side of the two culture divide.
The economists will not appreciate being told that the economic
theory they have used throughout their careers to build their
professional reputations and earn a living is predicated on
unscientiﬁc axiomatic assumptions. And the scientists will not
appreciate being told that the beneﬁts of protecting
environmental resources must be evaluated in terms of the
economic losses that could be suffered by people who depend on
these resources for their livelihood. But this dialogue could be
very beneﬁcial and quite productive if the members of both
cultures realize that the objective is not to win an intellectual
debate or defeat an intellectual foe. It is achieve the level of
mutual cooperation and understanding required to realize a once
in all human lifetimes opportunity. The opportunity is to protect
the lives of the 6.9 billion members of the extended human family
and the future existence of subsequent generations of this family
by developing and implementing scientiﬁcally viable solutions for
environmental problems.
Barak Obama repeatedly said during the presidential campaign
that his administration would do all that is required to effectively
deal with the problem of global warming. If President Obama
intends to keep this promise, there are three initiatives that
should be at the top of his political and legislative agenda. The
ﬁrst is to create a federally sponsored agency in which
mainstream economists and environmental scientists are
obliged to work closely together to develop scientiﬁcally viable
economic policies and programs that reduce worldwide
emissions of carbon dioxide to levels where large scale
irreversible changes in the climate system will not occur. The
second is to develop a proposal for implementing these policies
and programs in a post Kyoto agreement that privileges the well
being of all of humanity over the narrowly deﬁned and short
sighted economic interests of the United States and other
economically prosperous countries. And the third is to use all the
diplomatic and other resources required to ensure that this
proposal is implemented during the ﬁnal phase of forging the
terms of this agreement. If this initiative is successful, Barak
Obama will be remembered not merely as a great American
president but also as one of the most humane and enlightened
political leaders in the annals of human history. 
Robert Nadeau teaches environmental science and public policy
at George Mason University. His most recently published books
are The Wealth of Nature (Columbia University Press, 2003) and
The Environmental Endgame (Rutgers University Press, 2006).
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